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WHY DO PEOPLE JOIN TRADE UNIONS?  
___________ 
THE IMPACT OF WORKPLACE UNION DENSITY ON UNION RECRUITMENT 
 
By Jonas Toubøl and Carsten Strøby Jensen 
 
ABSTRACT: In this study the reasons for joining a trade union are analyzed statistically 
using high quality data from Statistics Denmark comprising the entire Danish 
workforce combined with European Social Survey data from rounds 1-3. These data 
enables measuring the effect of union density at the workplace level on union 
recruitment, which is not done before. Workplace union density is taken to measure 
the strength of the workplace’s custom of being union member creating an 
instrumental incentive to join the union. Self-placement on a political left-right scale 
measures political attitude taken to be a value rational motive. The statistical results 
indicate that the most important predictor of joining the union is workplace union 
density and only in a secondary manner does political attitude matter. It is concluded 
that the normative pressure of one’s colleagues is the dominating reason for joining a 
trade union. 
KEYWORDS: Union recruitment, union density, social custom theory, political attitude, 
rational choice, value rationality, European Social Survey 
1. INTRODUCTION 
With the overall union decline in the western countries since the 1980’s as background (Visser 
2006), the question of why some wage earners are members of trade unions while others are not, 
has attracted considerable attention the last decades. In general, four approaches to the study of 
variation in union membership and density can be identified: 1) studies of structural and 
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institutional changes (Green 1992; Ebbinghaus & Visser 1999; Kjellberg 2011), 2) studies of 
differences between those who are union-members and those who are not (Parkes & Razavi 2004; 
Ibsen et al. 2011; Kirmanoğlu & Başlevent 2012), 3) studies of wage earners who leave the unions 
(Andrew & Naylor 1994; Groot & van den Berg 1994; Ibsen et al. 2012; Cregan 2013), and 4) 
studies of wage earners who join the unions (McCracken & Sanderson 2004; Cregan 2013).1 This 
paper counts among the last kind, seeking to identify which factors that condition union 
recruitment and how they do so. 
 Focus will be on the possible significance of the workplace union density and political attitude 
for the likelihood that wage earners choose or choose-not to join the trade union. A very limited 
number of studies have in an empirical informed way examined the possible effect of union density 
on workplace level. This may seem paradoxical as the causes and effects of union density is a major 
subject of theoretical discussion and contentions. The reason for the small number of quantitative 
studies of the cause and effect of union density is that reliable data with information about union 
density at the workplace level as well as individual characteristics is rare.  
 In order to address this issue, the analysis of this paper utilizes rather unique data which 
provides information with regard to union membership status, union density at the workplace level 
and many other objective individual as well as company characteristics covering the entire Danish 
labour market in the period 2001-2007. In addition, we are also able to merge our data with 
European Social Survey data from rounds 1-3, providing variables measuring subjective views of 
the individuals for a subpopulation. Thus, in the same dataset on one hand we have high quality 
variables from Statistics Denmark providing information about a number of objective 
characteristics covering ca. 3.7 mio. individuals and ca. 150,000 workplaces in the period 2001-2007, 
and on the other hand we have variables from the European Social Survey rounds  in 2002, 2004 
and 2006 measuring a number of subjective views making up a subpopulation of 3,617 individuals. 
The register data and the data from European Social Survey are linked on an individual level using 
the Danish Central Personal Register. All data is handled anonymously. In that way we are for 
example able to combine register data for individuals regarding their education, employment, 
characteristics regarding the company where they are employed etc. with their statements in the 
European Social Survey (for example political attitude, work influence, attitude toward equality 
etc..)     
 In addition to the impact of workplace union density and political attitude on recruitment, other 
factors such as, job-mobility, income etc. will be included in the empirical analysis as well as the 
subsequent discussions. The results of the empirical analysis points to a number factors influencing 
the choice of the individuals with regard to union membership and in theoretical terms we find that 
                                                             
1 A fifth approach, maybe somewhat specific to Denmark, is studies of the competition and causes for individuals choice of either 
membership of a traditional ‘red’ union associated with the socialdemocratic labour movement or an ideological alternative ‘yellow’ trade 
union (Ibsen 2013, Høgeadahl 2013; Ibsen et al. 2012).membership of a traditional ‘red’ union associated with the socialdemocratic 
labour movement or an ideological alternative ‘yellow’ trade union (Ibsen 2013, Høgeadahl 2013; Ibsen et al. 2012).  
3 
 
both rational choice explanations as well as explanations stressing the importance of value 
rationality hold some validity. 
 Our case is that of Denmark. The Danish trade unions are relatively strong and 67 % of the 
labour force was organized in trade unions in 2007 (Jensen 2012). However, lately the union density 
among the traditional trade unions has dropped from 71% in 1995 to 61% in 2010 (Due & Madsen 
2009; Due et al. 2010:84; Toubøl & Gielfeldt 2011:15pp). This development is most outspoken 
among the unions who organize skilled and unskilled labour (Jensen 2012: 67pp; Toubøl & 
Gielfeldt 2011:15pp). These developments indicate that Danish trade unions face the same 
problems with regard to recruitment as do most trade unions in the western world . In that light, 
this paper aims at investigating the general theoretical explanations of why people join trade unions. 
 In the following section 2 we will outline and discuss various theories about union membership 
and recruitment. In section 3 we present data and variables and some preliminary descriptive 
indications of the variables’ relation to union recruitment. In section 4 we present our statistical 
model and the results of the analysis which subsequently in section 5 are discussed in relation to 
various theoretical explanations. In section 6 we conclude. 
 Overall our paper contributes to the analysis of why worker join the trade unions in three new 
ways. Firstly, we focus on the process of joining trade unions. On the individual level, we analyze 
what characterize those employees who join a trade union and compare them to those employees 
who do not join a trade union. Most other studies focus on the members that leave trade unions, or 
if the focus on the question of joining, data is very often limited (either qualitat ive or general 
accumulated data from national statistics that focus on structural factors). In our data we are able to 
identify those individuals who in a specific year have joined a trade union, and those individuals 
who have not joined a trade union. In that respect we can compare individuals who decided to 
become member of a trade union in a specific year with those individuals who decided not to 
become member. Secondly, we focus on how existing rates of organization on the workplace level 
influence the likelihood of an employee joins a trade union. This has not been done using data that 
enable us to control for a number of other factors like education, workplace characteristics etc.. 
Thirdly, we - by combining register data with survey data – are able to analyze if and how norms 
and subjective attitudes among employees influence their likelihood of joining a trade union taken a 
number of other factors into consideration. 
2. THEORIES ABOUT UNION RECRUITMENT AND UNION DENSITY 
There exists an extensive literature about trade unions, trade union density and trade unions 
recruitment. In this context we will not try to discuss all of it, but will try to make an overall 
presentation of some of the dominant perspectives focusing on some of the aspects we analyze in 
this article. 
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 Trade union density and shifts in density are usually explained with two overall frameworks of 
understanding. First, we have positions that focus especially on what could be called the structural 
determinants of trade union membership and density. Here, focus is on developments in the 
employment structure, the business cycles and other forms of macro structural change. Shifts in the 
employment structure from for example industry to service is used to explain changes (often 
declines) in trade unions density (Ebbinghaus & Visser 2000, Bryson et al. 2011). Within this overall 
framework we can also put positions that focus more on institutional characteristics on the labour 
market (Ebbinghaus & Visser 1999). That is for example the case in a number of studies that study 
the so-called Ghent effect on trade union membership (Scruggs 2002, Rie et al. 2011). They analyze 
how national institutions like the unemployment benefit system influence the likelihood of 
employees becoming members of trade unions. Other areas of focus within this institutional 
perspective could be on how changes in collective bargaining structures, changing employment 
conditions (contracts) etc. influence membership. Within these types of studies focus is mostly on 
different types of macro societal structures and how they influence membership recruitment and 
the trade unions density (Riley 1997).  
 The second overall framework for understanding trade union membership is focusing more 
specifically on the individual employee and on the individual’s interest in joining or leaving a trade 
union (Schnabel & Wagner 2007, Fazekas 2011, Ebbinghaus et al. 2011). Individual characteristics 
related to the single employee are used to explain the likelihood of whether different groups are 
member of a trade union. Differences between men and women, between young and old, between 
skilled and unskilled etc. are used to explain trends in union membership development (Schnabel & 
Wagner 2007). This type of studies tends to focus more on micro oriented types of explanations. 
They focus on the motives for and interests in trade union membership and are often based on 
studies using individual-level data. As presented in the introduction to this article we also primarily 
use individual-level data in our analysis. Therefore we will shortly present some of the theories and 
lines of argument within these types of study more specifically in this context.  
 Micro-sociological theories regarding the questions of why employees join trade unions can all 
in all be divided in two types of explanations stressing respectively interest-based or norm-based 
motives (or reasons) for joining a trade union (Visser 2002). Employees join trade unions because 
they have an interest in joining. They gain some advantages by joining that they would not have if 
they had not joined. That could be higher wages, more job security etc.. This is the basic 
assumption within rational choice oriented types of theories. The rational choice theories often 
have Olson (1965) as a central point of reference and stress the free-rider problem. Other positions 
stress the importance of norms and values, and argue that they have an autonomous influence on 
employees’ likelihood of joining a trade union. Some positions also argue – originally taking 
Coleman (1990) as a starting point – that the normative motives can be interpreted within a rational 
choice framework. 
 If we focus on the question about how trade union density on workplace level influence the 
employees decision on whether to join or not join a trade union, our expectation is that the 
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likelihood of joining will correlate with the level of union density at the workplace. The higher the 
density, the higher is the likelihood of non-organized employees will join the trade union. This can 
be explained within the theoretical frame of ‘social costume theory’ (Booth 1985, Visser 2002). 
Social costume theory argues that trade unions not only produces ‘material goods’ like high wages 
and security that can motivate employees to join a trade union. They also produce social norms 
stipulating that employees should be member of a trade union2. The norms put pressure on non-
union members and make it rational for the non-union members to join the union in order to avoid 
the sanctions that follow from violating the norms. The higher the density is on workplace level, 
the stronger is the norm expected to be, and the lower are the costs among the union-members to 
sanction violation of the norm: Even “[p]eople who do not believe in the costume, may 
nevertheless refrain from disobedience because of the consequences of loss of reputation among 
the rest of the community” (Visser 2002: 407). The fact that we would expect that existing density 
will influence the likelihood of employees joining the trade unions says however nothing about how 
big this effect is compared to other types of factors influencing trade unions density.  In this study 
we will be able to analyze the effects of work place density when controlling for a number of other 
factors. 
 Within the motivational oriented theories about trade union membership we can also identify 
some studies that stress the importance of the employees own normative and attitudinal 
characteristics (Riley 1997, Schnabel & Wagner 2007). Because trade unions are often connected 
with left wing policy development some studies have analyzed correlation between employees’ 
political attitudes and the likelihood of them becoming members of a trade union. As pointed out 
by Riley: “… various studies on the relationship between left-wing ideology and union membership 
consistently showed a significant positive correlation between the two variables.” (Riley 1997: 277). 
Attitudes and political orientation is also expected to influence the employees’ willingness to join a 
trade union. 
 As outlined above it is possible to identify a number of different theories that tries to answer the 
question, ‘why do employee join trade unions?’. We can make a distinction between more structural 
and more motivational oriented explanations, where the motivational theories focus on individual-
level analysis and the structural analysis focus on macro societal characteristics. It should however 
be stressed that there in not necessarily a conflict between the two types of theory; they can be seen 
a supplementing each other. The actual choice of joining or not-joining a trade union is motivated 
by the interests and norm of the individual employees, but his or hers choice is influenced by and 
embedded in the overall institutional and structural settings of the given society. Certain 
institutional arrangements (like a Ghent system for unemployment benefit) will increase the 
advantages related to becoming a member of a trade union. In that sense it is possible to combine 
the macro and the micro oriented explanations presented before (Fazekas 2011). 
                                                             
2 The social costume theory can also be used to explain why employees chose not to free ride as it would have been expected by Olson 
(Visser 2002). 
6 
 
 However, in this article the focus is on the motivational aspects of employees’ decision making 
with regard to union membership. To narrow it down our focal interest is in the relationship between 
the decision to join a union or not and 1) sanctioning norms creating social customs at the workplace and 2) general 
ideological and political attitudes. However, in the empirical analysis of this decision making as well as 
the subsequent discussion the effect of a number of other variables will be included as well. 
 Union density is taken to create a number of external incentives for joining that can be 
conceptualized within a rational choice theoretical framework. From this perspective, the act of 
joining the union is an instrumental one motivated by the prospect of increased utility. The utility 
can come in various forms that create negative and positive incentives. A negative incentive is for 
instance the prospect of being relieved of the pain caused by the peer pressure created by the  social 
custom of the workplace. The social custom and thereby the pain from the peer pressure, gains 
strength the higher the density is. A positive incentive could be to gain various goods that the union 
can offer, which is taken to grow as the union density increases thus increasing the union’s 
bargaining power and ability to provide goods. 
 Political attitude is taken to measures a value rational incentive for joining the union. This 
incentive should be understood with reference to identity. If the individual understands itself as a 
leftist person who as a fundamental value holds that the employees of a workplace should unite in 
trade unions, then the act of joining the union is not an instrumental one, but a value rational one, 
because the act is part of the individuals being itself. The act is not part in a more or less conscious 
calculus that aims at gaining some good or avoiding pain etc. For example, if the value rational 
incentive is strong enough, the individual would do the act of joining the union even though it 
knew that a prize to pay would follow in the form of for instance, discriminatory practices against 
unionized employees on the part of the employer. 
3. DATA AND VARIABLES 
Data stems from two sources: Statistics Denmark’s register data and European Social Survey (ESS) 
data.3 These data has, as mentioned, been merged on an individual level by the social security 
number (CPR-number). This enables us to add huge amounts of highly reliable information to what 
we already know about the individuals in the ESS. In the following we define the population and 
present the variables.  
 The research population is defined by five criteria’s: 1) All actively employed persons in 
Denmark 2001-2007 except for private entrepreneurs and CEOs 2) who work at a workplace with 
2 or more employed and 3) have an annual income between DKK 50,000 and 1,000,000 4) who 
participated in ESS rounds 1, 2 or 3, and 5) at the time they joined a trade union or participated in 
                                                             
3 Center for Survey and Survey/Register Data has prepared and delivered data. We are especially grateful to Leif Jensen who has been 
most helpful. 
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ESS aged 16 to 65. This definition leaves us with a total 742 cases which are not missing on any of 
the variables included in the model. 
3.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLES AND FOCAL VARIABLES 
The purpose of the statistical analysis is to identify variables that increases or decreases the 
likelihood of employees becoming member of a trade union. Our dependent variable is in that 
respect whether an employee has joined or has not joined a trade union in the period 2001 to 2007. 
 The dependent variable, Joined a union?, is binary and measures whether the individual did join a 
union (1) or not (0). In Denmark, the union membership fee is tax deductible. Each year, the trade 
unions report the membership fees paid by their members to the tax authorities. Statistics Denmark 
has access to these records, and has generated variables telling us whether the individual paid any 
TABLE 2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WORKPLACE UNION DENSITY AND  JOINING A UNION 
WORKPLACE UNION 
DENSITY 
JOINED UNION: NO   JOINED UNION: YES   TOTAL 
n Share   N Share   n Share 
0-10 % 72 100.00% 
 
0 0.00% 
 
72 100% 
11-20 % 5 55.56% 
 
4 44.44% 
 
9 100% 
21-30 % 16 66.67% 
 
8 33.33% 
 
24 100% 
31-40 % 32 49.23% 
 
33 50.77% 
 
65 100% 
41-50 % 46 53.49% 
 
40 46.51% 
 
86 100% 
51-60 % 22 45.83% 
 
26 54.17% 
 
48 100% 
61-70 % 35 38.89% 
 
55 61.11% 
 
90 100% 
71-80 % 46 30.67% 
 
104 69.33% 
 
150 100% 
81-90 % 19 15.08% 
 
107 84.92% 
 
126 100% 
91-100 % 10 5.78%   163 94.22%   173 100% 
Total 303 35.94%   540 64.06%   742 100% 
  
2 :  252.52 p-value : 0.000 
 
  
Gamma : 0.6684 ASE : 0.030 
 
    Kendall's tau-b : 0.4461 ASE : 0.023 
 
 
TABLE 1. DESCRIPTIVES FOR THE VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE STATISTICAL MODEL 
VARIABLE OBERSVATIONS  MEAN S.D. 25TH PERCEN TILE 75TH PERCEN TILE 
Joined union?  (0 no - 1 yes) 742 65.09 47.70 0 1 
Workplace union density (0 - 100%) 742 66.74 26.59 50 88.65 
Left-right scale (0 left - 10 right) 742 5.48 2.04 4 7 
Workplace size (number of employees) 742 134.01 426.60 5 72 
Sex (0 male - 1 female) 742 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Age (Years) 742 36.68 12.69 25 47 
Sector (0 private - 1 public) 742 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Education (Years) 742 12.86 2.51 12 15 
Income (DKK 1000) 742 183.35 99.06 117.67 223.80 
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union membership fee or not each year. Because it is the trade unions who report this information 
to the authorities and not the individuals the information is considered highly reliable.  If an 
individual did not pay any membership fee in year X but did in the following year Y we conclude 
that the individual joined a trade union in year Y. If the individual did not pay any membership fees 
in the period 2001-2007 the individual is considered a non-member. 
 Our first focal variable is Workplace union density generated from Statistics Denmark register data. 
It is constructed by dividing the number union members identified by the tax records as described 
above by the total number of ordinary wage earners at each workplace (all employees minus owners 
and CEO’s/private entrepreneurs). In this calculation all actively employed persons in Denmark are 
included, and not just those of the ESS population. This variable is a scale going from 0 and 100 %. 
We are able to measure the union density of the primary workplace each year. 
 The fact that workplace union density is not a constant during the period 2001-2007 has to be 
taken into consideration. The theoretical assumption is that the individual is influenced by the 
customs of the workplace. Workplace union density is taken to measure the strength of such a 
sanctioning custom creating an incentive for the individual to join the union: the higher the 
workplace union density, the stronger the incentive to join the union. Therefore, it does not make 
much sense to analyze the relation between the union density at time X and event of joining a 
union at time Y. These have to be synchronized. In order to handle this, the assigned workplace 
union density value is the one of the year the individual joined a union. If the individual did not join 
a union, we assign the workplace union density of the ESS interview year. This procedure is applied 
in all cases of variables measuring something that varies over time.  
FIGURE 1. SHARE OF WAGE EARNERS WHO JOIN UNION BY WORKPLACE UNION DENSITY 
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 A number of other studies have stressed the importance of trade union presence at workplace 
level for trade union recruitment. This has for example been done in a number of studies that have 
used European Social Survey data (Ebbinghaus et al. 2011, Schnabel & Wagner 2007). They are 
however not able to identify the actual rate of organization at workplace level. ESS data only makes 
it possible to evaluate whether there is trade union presence at a workplace. In these studies we do 
not know how many that are actually organized and how the level of organization correlate with the 
likelihood of employees joining of trade union. Workplace union density measures information at a 
higher level than the individual one, in this case the group level of the workplace. In that respect it 
provides a good example of how the combination of ESS and register data enables us to add group 
level information, rarely available in surveys. 
  Table 2 describes the relationship between Workplace union density and the Joined a union? variable. 
The relationship is positive in the sense that the higher union density the higher a proportion joins 
a union. This positive relationship is quite strong as indicated by the gamma-coefficient of 0.6684 
and the two variables are not independent as indicated by the significant 2-value.  
 The positive relationship between the two variables is depicted in figure 1, in which a linear 
trend line has been added. From this descriptive representation the relationship can be said to be 
roughly linear even though the relationship when union density is below 40 % is somewhat 
turbulent. Nonetheless, the descriptive analysis indicates a strong positive relationship between the 
variables as expected, giving us reason to proceed with more rigorous statistical testing of this 
apparent relationship. 
 It should be noticed that other studies (Schnabel & Wagner 2007) have also been focusing on 
the discussion about how trade unions at workplace level influence the probability of recruiting new 
TABLE 3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL ATTITUDE AND  JOINING A UNION 
LEFT TO RIGHT 
SCALE 
JOINED UNION: NO   JOINED UNION: YES   TOTAL 
n Share   n Share   n Share 
0       2  16.67% 
 
10 83.33% 
 
12 100% 
1                1 9.09% 
 
10 90.91% 
 
11 100% 
2               12 27.27% 
 
32 72.73% 
 
44 100% 
3               16 19.51% 
 
66 80.49% 
 
82 100% 
4               21 24.71% 
 
64 75.29% 
 
85 100% 
5               69 33.33% 
 
138 66.67% 
 
207 100% 
6               47 46.53% 
 
54 53.47% 
 
101 100% 
7     65 43.62% 
 
84 56.38% 
 
149 100% 
8               56 50.00% 
 
56 50.00% 
 
112 100% 
9               12 50.00% 
 
12 50.00% 
 
24 100% 
10                 2 12.50%   14 87.50%   16 100% 
Total           303 35.94%   540 64.06%   843 100% 
  
2 :  45.9376 p-value : 0.000 
 
  
Gamma : -0.2621 ASE : 0.045 
 
    Kendall's tau-b : -0.1648 ASE : 0.029   
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members. In a study where the used ESS data, they show that ‘trade unions presence’ at workplace 
level correlate highly with density. As they say: “… the simulations show that in Austria, the 
probability of being a union member increases from 9.7 to 44.4 percent if there is a union on the 
workplace.” (Schnabel & Wagner 2007: 28-29). They are however not able to analyze the effects of 
existing levels of organizing at workplace level due to lack of data in the ESS dataset.  
 Our second focal variable is the ESS variable Placement on left-right scale variable going from 0 (left) 
to 10 (right). We treat this variable as a continuous scale. This variable is taken to measure any 
attitudinal or normative inclination to join a trade union. Trade unions have historically been 
strongly associated or even synonymous with the left and their ‘opponents’, the employers, have 
historically had the same relation with the right. Therefore, if the individuals’ normative inclination 
is a factor when deciding whether or not to join the union, it is reasonable to expect it to be 
measurable as peoples self-placement on the political left-right axis. 
 Table 3 describes the relationship between political attitude and joining a union. The picture is 
not as clear cut as in the case of workplace union density. However, a weak negative relationship is 
indicated by the gamma coefficient of -0.2621 meaning that the further to the right on scale the 
smaller the share of wage earners who join the union. The variables are not independent of each 
other as indicated by the significant 2-value.  
 As can be seen from figure 2, the relationship is roughly linear with the major exception of 
those who place them self on the far right, grade 10, of the political spectrum. This group is the 
second most union joining one. However, the group only consists of 16 individuals meaning that 
FIGURE 2. SHARE OF WAGE EARNERS WHO JOIN UNION BY POLITICAL LEFT-RIGHT SCALE 
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the possibility of this deviation from the general trend is due to sampling, is imminent. This 
suspicion gains strength by the fact that such a deviation cannot be detected if we consider the 
relationship between union membership and political attitude (see appendix 1). Here, the grade 10 
group are the group with the smallest share of union members (62.71 % compared to the general 
mean of 74.03 % union members). 
 Nonetheless, the descriptive analysis indicates a weak negative relationship between the 
variables, confirming our theoretical expectation giving us reason to proceed with more rigorous 
statistical testing of whether this apparent relationship is a spurious one or not. However, we 
should bear in mind, that if the deviation from the general trend of the grade 10 group is due to 
sampling problems, the statistical model will tend to underestimate the actual effect of political 
attitude on the choice of joining the union. 
 Finally, we shall consider the relationship between the two focal variables. In this research 
design, they are taken to measure two different effects.  
 Theoretical, we distinguish between these two effects. But they could be intertwined. For 
instance, the social custom created by high union density could also involve being leftist in addition 
to being member of a union. If this is the case political attitude is not causing members to join, but 
is the cause of high union density. 
 In order to settle this question we have tested whether the two variables are independent from 
each other. Table 4 is the two-way table of workplace union density by quintiles and the political 
scale reduced to five categories. These reductions are done in order to be able to do valid statistical 
testing of the relationship between the variables. A weak negative relationship is indicated by the 
gamma coefficient meaning that the higher the union density the more leftist. However, this cannot 
be trusted, as the 2-value is far from statistical significant. We therefore conclude that the two 
variables are independent of each other, and that high union density does not cause the individuals 
in our sample to be more leftist or rightist for that matter. 
TABLE 4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADE UNION DENSITY AND POLITICAL ATTITUDE 
  LEFT TO RIGHT POLITICAL SCALE  
WORKPLACE UNION DENSITY 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
0-20 % 0.00% 8.51% 42.55% 42.55% 6.38% 47 100% 
21-40 % 1.22% 10.98% 45.12% 34.15% 8.54% 82 100% 
41-60 % 2.99% 14.18% 45.32% 32.09% 5.22% 134 100% 
61-80 % 1.97% 17.24% 45.32% 31.53% 3.94% 203 100% 
81-100 % 3.99% 17.03% 50.00% 25.72% 3.26% 276 100% 
Total 2.70% 15.36% 46.90% 30.46% 4.58% 742 100% 
  
2 :  17.9269 p-value : 0.328 
  
  
Gamma : -0.1593 ASE : 0.043 
    Kendall's tau-b : -0.1115 ASE : 0.03    
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3.2 CONTROL VARIABLES 
In addition to the focal variables a number of control variables are included. If we look upon the 
literature analyzing what characterize trade union members and trends in the density development a 
number of factors are usually stressed as important determinants for trade unions density. As 
mentioned in the review of the theories about trade unionism in section two, some of the factors 
used to explain differences in density are often macro oriented factors relating to institutional and 
structural characteristics. Other types of explanations are more oriented toward more individual 
characteristics relating directly to the employees. In this context we first and foremost focus on the 
later type of explanations partly because we use data relating to individuals, but also because we try 
to evaluated the factors that motivate the single employee to join or not join a trade union. 
 In order to analyze the specific effects of our two focal variables – level of union density at 
workplace level and political attitude (left-right wing orientation) – we control for a number of 
other factors that could be expected to influence employees likelihood of joining a trade union. 
 The control variables are Workplace size measured by as the number employees at the workplace, 
Sector (private or public), Newly employed at the workplace, Gender, Age, Country of origin, Years of 
education and Income. Our final model is a fixed-effect model in which we fixate the results across 10 
occupational categories and 21 industrial categories. These are included as dummy variables but their model 
estimates are only reported in the appendix as they are only included to fixate whatever effect these 
variables may have on the dependent variable. 
 The choice of control variables are guided by what the literature has found to be central 
variables when it comes to explaining high or low level of trade union membership. We will 
comment a bit on the different control variables. Some of the control variables relate to personal 
and individual characteristics (gender, age etc), while others relate more to characteristics relating to 
the workplace (workplace size, sector, industry). Finally some control variable relates to the 
competence level of the employees and to the work experience (education, newly employed etc.).     
 Workplace size is often highlighted as one of the most important factors influencing the 
likelihood of seeing high or low levels of density in a company or at a workplace. Workplace size 
correlate positively with union density in a number of studies (Riley 1997). One explanation to this 
observation is that the costs of organizing is lower in big workplaces than in small workplaces, “We 
expect the probability of unions membership to rise with establishment size because unions costs 
of recruiting and organizing should be lower in larger units.” (Schnabel & Wagner 2007: 22). 
 Demographic factors like gender and age are often also used as variables in studies of trade 
unionism. And they are also included as control variables in our analysis. There seems however not 
to be any clear evidence of correlation (Riley 1997). Or maybe to be more precise, the correlation 
depends very much on other circumstances. The importance of gender and age are interrelated with 
other factors and the effects are dependent on the overall structure of the labour market. Women 
for example tends not to organize as much as men if they are working in the industrial periphery or 
secondary sector (Doeringer & Piore 1975; Reich et al. 1973), but when they work in the public 
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sector like in the Nordic countries they often have a higher likelihood of being member of a trade 
union than men as observed by Schnabel & Wagner (2007:24). If we look upon the membership 
profile of trade unions, young employees generally seems to be less organized than older 
employees. This is an observation stressed in many studies, although there seems to be no real 
longitunal studies of cohort effects. Ebbinghaus et al. writes: “In general, the relation between age 
and unionization is expected to be concave: membership tends to be low among younger workers, 
increases with age and falls when employees exit from work.” (Ebbinghaus et al. 2011: 110). 
  Education and occupational position could also be expected to influence the likelihood of a 
given employee being member of a trade union. Therefore they are used as control variables in our 
analysis. In our model, the level of education is measured as the number of years of received 
education including elementary school. When we control the effects of occupational position we 
use however a fixed-effect model meaning that we don’t estimate the direct effects of one 
occupation position compared to another position. We however neutralize the effects of 
occupational level in the overall statistical model. Generally we would expect that employees with 
low or very high levels of education would tend to be less organized than employees with medium 
level of education. This expectation is in line with observations in the literature. As stated by 
Ebbinghaus et al.: “Employees with low (less than secondary) or high (tertiary) education are often 
reported to be less unionized than those with medium-level (secondary) education.” (Ebbinghaus et 
al. 2011: 111). We also use income as a control variable in our analysis expecting that it measure 
some similar effects like education and occupational status. 
3.3. STATISTICAL MODELS 
The statistical tool is a multivariate logistic fixed-effect regression model which predicts the 
likelihood of joining a union. The final model has 2 focal variables (workplace union density and political 
attitude), 7 control variables and is fixed across 10 occupations and 21 industries which in the model 
figures as 31 dummy variables.4  
 In table 4 we list three different models which aims at predicting how likely it is that an 
individual will join a trade union. We start by comparing the models before we turn to a more in 
depth presentation of the estimated effects of first focal variables and then control variables. 
 Model 1 only has two predictors; our focal variables. In both cases the estimated effect is 
statistical significant and the direction of the effect is as we would expect based on the descriptive 
analysis of the relation between the variables: Higher union density at workplace level increases the 
likelihood that the individual choose to join a trade union and the more rightist the political attitude 
the less likely it is that the individual joins a trade union. Considering the size of the coefficients, 
union density seems to be a much more important predictor than political attitude. 
                                                             
4 The dummy estimates are listed in table 6 in the appendix. 
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 In Model 2 we add all the control variables. The picture with regard to our focal variables is the 
same as in model 1. Union density is the most powerful predictor but political attitude is still 
significant and predicts that the more rightist the less likely joining a union is.  
 Model 3 is the fixed effects model in which the effects of occupation and industry are cancelled 
out by the inclusion of dummy variables (estimates not reported). The general picture is the same 
with a few exceptions.  
 The public sector estimate changes from positive to negative meaning that model 3 estimates 
that it is less likely for public sector employees to join the union than private sector employees 
which is the opposite of model 2. However, the estimate is uncertain and is not significant. 
 The estimated effect of union density increases and so does the effect of political attitude. Minor 
changes can be observed with regard to the control variables of which only the effect of being 
female should be mentioned, because the estimated effect in model 3 is no longer significant.  
 Otherwise, the introduction of the fixed effect dummies do not change much, which is also 
indicated by the change in log-likelihood not being significant meaning that the fixed effect model 
does not fit better than model 2. 
TABLE 4. MODELS OF FACTORS INFLUENCING THE LIKELIHOOD OF JOINING A TRADE UNION 
Dependent variable: Joined union? 
PARAME TER 
MODEL 1: FOCAL EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES  
  
MODEL 2: FOCAL EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES INCLUDING CONTROLS  
  
MODEL 3: FIXED EFFECTS OF 
OCCUPATION AND INDUSTRY  
  Coefficient S.E.   Coefficient S.E.   Coefficient S.E. 
Constant -1.446*** 0.376 
 
1.276 0.987 
 
-2.105 1.754 
Workplace union density 4.664*** 0.399 
 
5.121*** 0.483 
 
5.677*** 0.565 
Political att. on left-right scale -0.163*** 0.462 
 
-0.122* 0.050 
 
-0.119* 0.054 
Workpl. size (1000 employees) - - 
 
-0.077 0.226 
 
0.051  0.259 
Public sector - - 
 
0.179 0.245 
 
-0.638 0.381 
Newly employed - - 
 
-0.852*** 0.218 
 
-0.851*** 0.232 
Female - - 
 
0.408* 0.207 
 
0.509* 0.234 
Age - - 
 
-0.060*** 0.010 
 
-0.059*** 0.011 
Education (Years) - - 
 
-0.015 0.042 
 
0.012 0.049 
Indcome (DKK 1000) - - 
 
-0.003* 0.001 
 
-0.003* 0.001 
         
Test statistics                 
Pseudo R2 0.225 
 
0.320 
 
0.360 
AIC 749.634 
 
672.421 
 
692.083 
BIC 763.462 
 
718.515 
 
871.847 
Log-likelihood -371.817*** 
 
-326.211*** 
 
-307.041 
Degrees of freedom 3 
 
10 
 
39 
Number of observations 742 
 
742 
 
742 
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4.  DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
The most powerful statistical significant predictor is workplace union density that is one of our 
focal variables. In all three models the coefficient expressing the estimated difference between 0 % 
and 100 % density is very large. This confirms the initial descriptive analysis of the relationship 
between the focal variables and dependent variable. However, political attitude is also statistical 
significant and is quite powerful. The coefficient expresses the change caused by one step to the 
right on the 11 point scale measuring political attitude. This is interesting because in a cross-
national study by Schnabel & Wagner (2007) utilizing ESS data the correlation between political 
attitude and trade union membership was not confirmed and found to be significant for the 
majority of the analyzed countries. 
 Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the effects of workplace union density and 
political attitude as predicted by model 3 that may further the understanding their relative 
importance. As accounted for earlier, the two variables are statistically independent.  
 We have constructed a standard person (see notes of figure 3 for details) whose likelihood of 
FIGURE 3. PREDICTED CHANCE OF JOINING A UNION BY WORKPLACE UNION DENSITY AND 
POLITICAL ATTITUDE 
 
Note: The standard person is a man of age 36.68 who has received 12.86 years of education and has an income of DKK 183,350 pr. year. He is a craftsman working at a private sector 
workplace with 134 employees in the construction industry. Leftist is assigned the 25 percentile score of 4 on a political left-right scale with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 11. 
Rightist is assigned the 75 percentile score of 7. 
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joining a union only varies by union density and political attitude. Union density is measured by the 
horizontal axis and likelihood of joining a trade union is measured by the vertical axis.  The two 
logistic regression lines are a leftish standard person and a rightist standard person. The leftist has 
been assigned the 25 percentile score of 4 on the political left-right and the rightist has been assigned 
the 75 percentile score of 7. The gap between the two lines thus expresses a 3-point change on the 
political attitude scale going from 0 to 10. 
 The first overall observation concerns the effect of union density on the likelihood of joining a 
union. The modeled effect is accelerating. At the lower end of the union density axis the increase in 
likelihood of joining a union as density rises is very modest but the slope gets increasingly steeper as 
the union density increases and it only flattens slightly at the top. 
 The second observation concerns the effect of political attitude. The two drop lines illustrate the 
difference in workplace union density between the points where the two standard persons reach 50 
% likelihood of joining a union. The leftist standard person has a 50 % likelihood of joining a trade 
union around the point of 64 % union density and for the rightist this point is 70 %. Thus, the 
difference on the horizontal axis is ca. 6 %-points. This example illustrates that even though the 
effect of workplace union density dominates, the effect of political attitude should not be neglected. 
 Considering the control variables the first interesting finding is that workplace size measured by 
the number of employees is not significant. This is contrary to the findings of many other studies 
(Riley 1997; Schnabel & Wagner 2007). However, another major study of the factors determining 
union membership using Danish data also finds, that workplace size does not play a role (Ibsen et 
al. 2011:16).  
 Secondly we also observe an insignificant sector dummy. This is surprising as the union density 
as well as the recruitment rate is much higher in the public sector than in the private sector: within 
our study population 78.41 % of the public sector workers joined a union compared to 59.22 % of 
the private sector workers. However, this result is consistent with prior studies (Ibsen et al. 2011:16; 
Ibsen et al. 2012:159). We will point to two primary explanations. First of all, it might simply be 
that workplace union density in itself produce the high level of union density and union recruitment 
in the public sector. That is to say, there is nothing special about the public sector that affects a 
higher union recruitment rate, but the fact that the preexisting workplace union density is higher 
than in the private sector affects a higher union recruitment rate. Second, gender may help to 
explain this. Model 2 as well as model 3 estimates that women to a greater extent than men join 
unions. These estimates are statistical significant. The proportion of women within the public 
sector is much bigger than in the private sector. In 2007, 68 % percent of the employees in the 
public sector were women compared to 37 % in the private sector. The observed higher 
recruitment rate in the public sector might therefore in part be due to the high proportion of 
women and not due to some special property of the public sector. 
 Third, in our analysis we observe that that younger people are more likely to join the union than 
older people. This in contrary to most studies of union members vs. non-members, which 
consistently find that older people more often are members than young people. However, our study 
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is focused on the situation of decision making with regard to union-membership or not. In this 
light, the result actually makes good sense, simply because you are young when you enter the labor 
market and for the first time are faced with the decision whether to join the union. Then, if you at 
the beginning of your work life do not choose to join a union it probably becomes more and more 
unlikely that you are going to change this decision as you grow older. 
 Finally and fourth our results shows that education does not play any role, no matter whether 
the occupation controls are included as in model 3 or not as in model 2. This is surprising if we 
compare with results from the international literature (Ebbinghaus et. al. 2011). We would expect 
bigger differences between different groups on the labour market. However, income has a 
significant effect in both model 2 and 3 predicting that, the higher the income the lower the 
likelihood of joining a union. This result is in line with other studies of union membership which 
finds that the highest incomes are less likely to join the union than the middle incomes (Ibsen et al. 
2012).  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this article our focus has primarily been on the motivational aspects of employees’ decision 
making with regard to union membership. We have been interested in analyzing the factors that 
influence decision making in relation to employee’s willingness to join or not to join a union. Our 
overall focus have theoretically been on analyzing if joining a trade union can be seen as a result of 
– on the one side - social custom at workplace level or whether it is – on the other side - a result of 
political or ideological values. These two focal points we see as related to the classical weberian 
sociological discussion about whether social action is driven by instrumental or value rational forms 
of action. We have tried to establish an analytical and statistical framework, that allow us to analyze 
these different types of motives controlling for a number of other factors usually mentioned in the 
literature about trade unionism. We have used data from the Statistics Denmark allowing us to use 
register data, which among other things supply us with the union density at workplace level. These 
data have been combined with European Social Survey data measuring subjective values and 
political attitudes among union and non-union members. We have been able to combine these 
dataset on micro level focusing on individuals.  
 All in all our conclusion in this paper is quite clear. The most important factor that motivates 
non-union members to become union member is whether his or hers colleagues at the workplace 
are members of a trade union. If the level of trade unions membership is high on workplace level 
the likelihood of a non-union member becoming a member is very high. The existing level of trade 
union membership on workplace level has a thorough influence on membership commitment.    
 Our analysis also indicates, that political attitude plays a role when non-union members decide if 
they should join a trade union. Leftist tends to join a trade union more often than non-leftist, also 
when we take a number of other factors into consideration. In that respect the analysis confirms 
our overall theoretical expectations. 
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 However, the instrumental motives created by among other things social customs at the 
workplace associated with the union density variable seem to carry more weight compared to value 
rational motives when employees decide whether or not to join the union. Therefore, answering the 
overall question of the paper - why do people join trade unions? - we can conclude that they primarily do 
so because it is expected of them by their colleagues, and to a secondary and more limited extend 
because they identify with the ideals and values of the trade unions.  
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 5. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL ATTITUDE AND  TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP 
LEFT TO RIGHT 
SCALE 
MEMBER OF TRADE UNION: NO   MEMBER OF TRADE UNION: YES   TOTAL 
n %   n %   n % 
0 15  27.27% 
 
40 72.73% 
 
55 100% 
1 11  18.97% 
 
47 81.03% 
 
58 100% 
2 34  21.66% 
 
123 78.34% 
 
157 100% 
3 81  26.13% 
 
229 73.87% 
 
310 100% 
4 85  21.68% 
 
307 78.32% 
 
392 100% 
5 207  22.65% 
 
707 77.35% 
 
914 100% 
6 118  27.83% 
 
306 72.17% 
 
424 100% 
7 151  26.54% 
 
418 73.46% 
 
569 100% 
8 142  34.30% 
 
272 65.70% 
 
414 100% 
9 26  31.33% 
 
57 68.67% 
 
83 100% 
10 22  37.29%   37 62.71%   59 100% 
Total 892  25.97%   2543 74.03%   3435 100% 
  
2 :  33.0158 p-value : 0.000 
 
  
Gamma : -0.1151 ASE : 0.026 
 
    Kendall's tau-b : -0.066 ASE : 0.015   
 
 
FIGURE 4. SHARE OF TRADE UNION MEMBERS BY POLITICAL LEFT-RIGHT SCALE 
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TABLE 6. PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF MODEL 3’S FIXED EFFECT DUMMIES 
Fixed effect parameter estimates 
INDUSTRY  
 
OCCUPATION  
Category Coefficient S.E.   Category Coefficient S.E. 
Agriculture, fishing, mining Reference 
 
Managers Reference 
Mfr. of food, beverages & tobacco  -0.567 1.398 
 
Professionals -0.210 0.674 
Mfr. of textiles, wood prod. & printing 0.552 1.250 
 
Technicians & associate prof. -0.199 0.643 
Mfr. of chemicals, plastic & mineral prod. -0.312 1.235 
 
Clerical support workers -0.469 0.697 
Mfr. of basic metals and fabr. metal prod. 0.412 1.168 
 
Service and sales workers 0.086 0.710 
Mfr. of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 1.669 1.179 
 
Agriculture & fishery workers -0.182 1.677 
Construction, electr., gas & water supply 0.585 1.225 
 
Craft & related trades workers 0.939 0.732 
Sale and rep. of motor vehicles. sale of fuel 0.390 1.267 
 
Plant & machine operators 0.434 0.818 
Wholesale except of motor vehicles 0.687 1.155 
 
Elementary occupations 0.150 0.713 
Re. trade and repair work exc. of m. vehic. 0.956 1.170 
 
Unknown occupation 0.513 0.652 
Hotels and restaurants 0.830 1.244 
    
Transport 0.852 1.215 
    Post and telecommunications 1.704 1.352     
Finance and insurance 0.561 1.217 
    Letting and sale of real estate 0.862 1.342 
    Business activities 0.762 1.139 
    Public administration 2.408 1.322 
    Education 2.005 1.229 
    Human health activities 1.556 1.224 
    Social institutions etc. 1.321 1.203 
    Associations. culture and refuse disposal 2.484* 1.222         
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